SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent Third Circuit cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas.offederal practice.
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28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1988)-Ferens v. Deere & Co., 862 F.2d 31 (3d Cir.
1988).
MOTION

FOR CHANGE

OF VENUE

PURSUANT

TO

Albert J. Ferens was injured in an accident involving a combine manufactured and distributed by John Deere, a Delaware
corporation, onJuly 5th, 1982. 862 F.2d at 32. Ferens, a Pennsylvania resident, purchased the combine from the Uniontown
Farm Equipment Company located in Uniontown, Pennsylvania.
The injured party along with his wife, instituted two actions
against Deere as a result of this accident. The first action was
brought in the Western District of Pennsylvania on July 3rd,
1985, alleging breach of warranty. The breach of warranty complaint was filed within the four-year statute of limitations for such
claims, and was stayed pending the resolution of the present matter. Id. at 32-33. The Ferenses instituted the second action in
the Southern District of Mississippi on July 25th, 1985. The
complaint was based on the doctrines of strict liability in tort and
negligence. Id. at 33. The Ferenses elected to bring the strict
liability suit in Mississippi because the defendant was authorized
to conduct business there, and because the applicable statute of
limitations in Mississippi was six years. Conversely, had the action originated in Pennsylvania, it would have been precluded by
that state's two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 33 n.2.
After the defendant filed an answer, the Ferenses successfully transferred the Mississippi action to the Western District of
Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) whereupon
the strict liability and negligence actions were consolidated with
the breach of warranty claim. Ferens, 862 F.2d at 33. Subsequent
to transfer, the Western District of Pennsylvania granted Deere's
motion for summary judgment, determining that the strict liability and negligence actions were barred by Pennsylvania's twoyear statute of limitations. Id. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. The United
States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case to the
Third Circuit for determination of whether the law of the transferee or transferror forum applied. Id.
The Third Circuit panel, consisting of Chief Judge Gibbons,
andJudges Seitz and Aldisert, affirmed the decision of the district
court holding that the two-year statute of limitations of Penn797
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sylvania barred the claim. Id. at 36. Chief Judge Gibbons, writing for the court, began his analysis by stating that for conflict of
law purposes, Mississippi treats its statute of limitations as procedural law. Id. at 34. Thus, the judge recognized that Mississippi's state courts, as well as its federal courts sitting in diversity,
would implement Mississippi's statute of limitations in this case.
Id. at 34 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117, 2124
(1988)). The court, however, refused to embrace the Ferenses'
position that this rule applied where a plaintiff procured a transfer pursuant to § 1404(a). Id. at 34-35. In holding that the Pennsylvania federal district court (transferee) was not required to
apply the same procedural law as the Mississippi federal district
court (transferror), the majority referred to the purpose behind
§ 1404(a). Id. at 35. The court explained that the Act should not
be read to allow forum shopping, but instead should be construed in a manner that fosters federal-state uniformity. Id. (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636-38 (1964); Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
The majority recognized that the Ferenses first brought the
action in Mississippi federal court because they were precluded,
by the two-year statute of limitations, from bringing it directly in
the state or federal court of Pennsylvania. Id. The court was unwilling to allow the Ferenses "to use § 1404(a) and a brief stop in
Mississippi to achieve a result in the federal courts of Pennsylvania that they could not achieve in the state courts of Pennsylvania." Id. at 35-36. Further, the court reasoned that
licensing plaintiffs to utilize § 1404(a) in this manner would, in
effect, transform the "longest state statute of limitations into the
federal statute of limitation to be applied in diversity cases where
the plaintiffs can initially bring the action in the favorable state
and subsequently transfer it to a convenient forum." Id. at 36.
In dissent, Judge Seitz stated that since the Ferenses were
permitted to file in Mississippi's district court, insofar as venue
and personal jurisdiction were concerned, the choice of law
should remain unaffected by the subsequent transfer. Id. at 37
(Seitz, J., dissenting). Judge Seitz reasoned that the purpose of
§ 1404(a) is solely trial convenience, and is not intended to impact on change of law considerations. Id. The judge also asserted that the Act contains no language representing a design
which prohibits a plaintiff from obtaining a transfer. Id.
The dissent further disagreed with the finding that to allow
the Ferenses to utilize § 1404(a) would permit forum shopping.
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Id. Judge Seitz posited that "[f]orum shopping is irrelevant to
the objectives of the transfer statute because a transfer gives a
plaintiff no procedural or substantive right he did not already
possess." Id.
The Third Circuit correctly recognized the inherent danger
in permitting plaintiffs to seek transfers in this manner. Indeed,
the Ferenses brought the first action in Pennsylvania and the second action in Mississippi, because the latter would have been
barred under Pennsylvania law. It is true, as the dissent asserts,
that transfer does not give a plaintiff any additional rights. By
allowing such transfers, however, plaintiffs are encouraged to
bring frivolous actions or to sever genuine ones in illegitimate
jurisdictions so that they may be later transferred. This illusive
use of transfer is not within the true intent of the statutory provision.
Robert A. Burke

CIVIL

RICO-LIMITATIONS

ON ACTIONS-LAST INJURY Discov-

ERY RULE IS INSUFFICIENT TO GOVERN CIVIL

RICO LIMITA-

TIONS PERIOD, NECESSITATING CREATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE LAST PREDICATE ACT RULE TO DETERMINE COMMENCE-

MENT OF RELEVANT ACCRUAL PERIOD-Keystone Insurance Co. v.

Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1988).
The defendants, collectively referred to as the Houghton
Group, submitted fraudulent insurance claims to Keystone Insurance Co. (Keystone) arising from automobile accidents occurring
in November 1977 andJuly 1980. 863 F.2d at 1126. AJuly 1981
mailing to Keystone regarding the 1980 accident led to the conviction of the Houghton Group members on mail fraud charges
involving the claims to Keystone, as well as other fraudulent
claims to different insurance companies. Id. at 1126-27. The
criminal record indicated that a mailing on September 19th,
1983, to an insurer other than Keystone, was the most recent
mailing underlying the Houghton Group's conviction. Id. at
1127. A criminal court sentenced the defendants on June 20th,
1986, and one month later, Keystone filed a civil RICO claim in
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the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
After a non-jury trial, the district court held that the relevant
four-year statute of limitations period barred Keystone's suit and
accordingly entered judgment for the Houghton Group. Id. at
1127. The district court found that although Keystone sufficiently proved each element of the civil RICO claim, the insurance company "knew or should have known," by mid-1981, of
the last injury that Keystone incurred. Id. Accruing the limitations period from that time, the court concluded that Keystone
filed its suit after the four-year limitations period had elapsed. Id.
Keystone appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed, announcing a new rule governing
civil RICO statute of limitations analysis.
Writing for the three-judge panel, Judge Mansmann articulated the Third Circuit's newly fashioned rule defining the civil
RICO limitations period:
[T]he limitations period

. . .

runs from the date the plaintiff

knew or should have known that the elements of a civil RICO
cause of action existed, unless, as a part of the same pattern of
racketeering activity there is further injury to the plaintiff or
further predicate acts occur which are part of the same pattern. In that case, the accrual period shall run from the time
when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the last injury
or the last predicate act which is part of the same pattern of
racketeering activity. The last predicate act need not have resulted in injury to the plaintiff but must be part of the same
"pattern."
Id. at 1126.
Prior to giving its reasoning for the decision, the court of appeals
noted that federal courts had not previously adopted a uniform rule
for determining when civil RICO causes of action accrue. Id. at
1127. Further, the court acknowledged that although the Supreme
Court adopted the present, uniform four-year statute of limitations
period, the nation's highest court had yet to decide the accrual issue. Id. Embracing its opportunity to color an empty canvas, the
court of appeals began its analysis. Id.
Initially, the court explained that a proper accrual rule must reflect the congressional intent and purpose behind the RICO statute.
Id. at 1129. Attempting to illustrate the congressional mindset,
Judge Mansmann cited the legislative mandate that RICO "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose." Id. at 1128
(quoting Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
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§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 942, 947 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961
(1982)). Significantly, the court concluded that the liberal construction language required, at a minimum, that the court resist any inclination to restrict RICO. Id. Moreover, the court of appeals offered
Supreme Court precedent that imposed a broad interpretation of
the statute. Id. at 1128-29 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 498 (1985)). With this view, the appeals court next addressed the inadequacy of the accrual rule utilized by the district
court. Id. at 1129.
Judge Mansmann charged that the "last injury" discovery rule
applied by the district court did not sufficiently address the continuity element of the RICO offense because that rule applied solely
to the injury component and not the "pattern" component of the
RICO claim. Id. The last injury discovery rule requires the limitations period to accrue from the "date the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the last injury to the plaintiff caused by a predicate
act." Id. The court explained that the last injury discovery rule fails
to effectuate the purpose of the RICO statute in situations where
further predicate acts occur that do not injure the plaintiff, but are
nonetheless part of the former "pattern" and occur after the plaintiff's last injury. Id. at 1130. Accordingly, the court concluded that
the appropriate discovery rule should apply to not only the injury
element of RICO, but the pattern element as well. Id. Further, in
line with its recognition that the substantive elements of the RICO
claim are distinct from the injury derived therefrom, the court modified the rule by applying a "knew or should have known" standard
to each element of the RICO cause of action. Id. The court posited
that before the limitations period can begin to accrue, the plaintiff
must be in a position to "know or should know" of his injury, as well
as "know or should know" that a predicate act, causing injury to him
or another, is part of the same pattern of racketeering. Id.
Summarily, the court of appeals reasoned that because a plaintiff has not theoretically been injured under civil RICO until the requisite pattern element has been satisfied, it would be inappropriate
to commence the limitations period before that pattern isfully developed. Id. at 1133 (emphasis added). The court's desire to promote
the operative "pattern" component of RICO enabled it to avoid application of the simple discovery rule and the Clayton Act rule due
to their inability to provide sufficient protection for RICO victims.
Id. at 1133-35. In doing so, the court promotes the congressional
intent regarding the statute's liberal interpretation and the actual
substantive components of RICO. Significantly, the opinion fails to
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refer to perhaps the most compelling support for its decision-public policy.
Conceptually, statutes of limitation are created, in part, on the
"belief that there is a point beyond which a prospective defendant
should no longer need to worry about the possible commencement
in the future of an action against him or her." BARRON'S LEGAL
DICT. 454 (1984). Indeed, a prospective defendant, who continues
to violate the law through a "pattern" of injurious or criminal conduct, should and must be made to worry about the possibility of
future action against him. The proper accrual rule, as fashioned by
this court, does not afford a defendant such undeserved peace of
mind. Instead, it offers additional protection and opportunity to the
unfortunate victims of civil RICO violations.
Luke P. lovine

BANKRUPTCY-CHAPTER

13-CRIMINAL RESTITUTION OBLIGA-

TIONS CONSTITUTE DISCHARGEABLE DEBT-In re LorraineJohn-

son-Allen, 871 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1989).
This case resulted from the consolidated appeals of three
similarly situated criminal defendant-debtors: the Davenports,
Lorraine Johnson-Allen, and Ruby Steffler (debtors). 871 F.2d at
422-23. After pleading guilty to charges of welfare fraud, the
debtors were directed to pay restitution to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW), and were placed on probation. Following their sentencing, the debtors all filed voluntary
petitions for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code. In each instance, their criminal restitution payments were
denoted as unsecured debt owed to the DPW. The bankruptcy
court, without any challenge from the creditors, approved the
debtors' Chapter 13 plans.
The probation department subsequently instituted violation
of probation proceedings against all the debtors when they failed
to make their restitution payments. The court of common pleas
established that the restitution order was applicable despite the
debtors' Chapter 13 plans. Id. at 422. Thereafter, the Davenports instituted an action in bankruptcy court seeking declaratory
relief with respect to the dischargeability of their criminal restitu-
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tion payments. The bankruptcy court found that their responsibility to pay restitution was dischargeable under Chapter 13. Id.
The district court, on appeal, disagreed, concluding that the obligation did not constitute debt within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
In a separate matter, the bankruptcy court similarly held that
both Johnson-Allen's and Steffler's "restitution obligations were
dischargeable under Chapter 13." Id. at 423. In reversing, the
district court again held that discharge of a state imposed criminal obligation violated principles of comity and federalism. Id.
Judge Rosenn, writing for the court, recognized that the
question of ripeness presented a threshold issue prior to review
of the case on its merits. Id. Adopting the rationale of the Ninth
Circuit, the court held that Johnson-Allen's and Steffler's claims
were not ripe since neither had finished their Chapter 13 plan
and thus it was unknown which discharge provision of the Bankruptcy Code would apply. Id. (citing In re Heincy, 858 F.2d 548,
550 (9th Cir. 1988)). Judge Rosenn then determined that because the Davenports had obtained a discharge of their debts
under 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a), the issue of dischargeability was
ripe with regard to them. Id.
Addressing the issue of whether the obligation to pay restitution constitutes a debt under the Bankruptcy Code, the court
noted that the "Code defines 'debt' as a 'liability on a claim' "
and further explained that a claim is "a right to payment." Id. at
424 (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(4), (11) (West 1979 & Supp.
1988)). The court observed that Congress had advised that the
term "claim" be given the "broadest possible definition." Id.
(quoting H. Rep. No. 595, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 309; S. Rep. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22).
Interpreting the "plain language of the statute," Judge
Rosenn posited that the restitution obligation could not be construed as a "claim" or "debt" unless the obligation created a
right to payment. Id. Judge Rosenn noted that the criminal statute under which the debtors were prosecuted, defines restitution
as "the return of the property of the victim or payment in cash or
the equivalent thereof pursuant to an order of the court." Id. at
424-25 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1106(d) (Purdon
1983)). In addition, the court observed that the restitution statute confers sole responsibility for instituting judicial proceedings
for enforcement with the probation department. Id. at 425 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1106(f) (Purdon 1983)).
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Despite what he believed to be the plain language of the statute, Judge Rosenn acknowledged that a majority of bankruptcy
courts have renounced the argument that "restitution obligations
are 'debts' within the meaning of the Code." Id. at 424 (citing In
re Kohr, 82 Bankr. 706 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1988); In re Thompson, 77
Bankr. 646 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); In re Pelligrino, 42 Bankr.
129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984); In reJohnson, 32 Bankr. 614 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1983); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1981)). Additionally, Judge Rosenn conceded that dicta in the
Supreme Court's recent opinion of Kelley v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36,
50 (1986), supported the contention that there was " 'serious
doubt' as to whether Congress intended restitution obligations
to constitute debt." 871 F.2d at 426 (citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36, 50 (1986)).
However, Judge Rosenn concluded that Kelly was inapplicable since it dealt with the issue of debt under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. Judge Rosenn instead embraced the rationale applied by the Second Circuit in In re Robinson, 776 F.2d
30 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kelly v. Robinson,
479 U.S. 36 (1986), holding that the restitution obligation constituted debt under Chapter 13 since the probation department had
a right to enforce payment. Id. at 427.
Finally, Judge Rosenn noted that Chapter 13 requires the
discharge of all debts upon completion of the repayment plan.
Id. at 428. Judge Rosenn distinguished Chapter 7 which specifically exempts ten categories of debt from discharge, including
criminal restitution obligations, from Chapter 13 which provides
only one exception which notably does not deal with criminal restitution payments. Id. Judge Rosenn interpreted this silence,
along with Congress's objective of increasing the accessibility of
the Chapter 13 alternative and the plain language of the Chapter,
to indicate Congress's approval of discharging criminal restitution under Chapter 13. Id. at 427-28.
Judge Hutchinson disagreed with the majority's characterization of criminal restitution payments as debt. Id. at 429
(Hutchinson, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Hutchinson
disagreed with the majority's reading of Kelly and their disregard
for the judicially created exception to jurisdiction by bankruptcy
courts over state criminal proceedings. Id. at 429-30 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). Judge Hutchinson observed that while the
United States Supreme Court has not decided whether criminal
restitution payments are embodied within the meaning of debt, it
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has differentiated them from other indebtedness. Id. at 430-31
(Hutchinson, J., dissenting). In light of the persuasive dicta in
Kelly and the lack of specific legislative history contrary to the judicially recognized exception, Judge Hutchinson would hold that
criminal restitution obligations are not affected by a discharge
under Chapter 13. Id. at 431-32 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
Although the impact of this decision may be disturbing, the
court has correctly adhered to the letter of the law. Congress's
choice to exempt criminal restitution obligations from discharge
under Chapter 7, while at the same time failing to include this
same provision when amending Chapter 13, is not mere oversight. Until such time as either the Supreme Court or Congress
decides to classify criminal restitution obligations as other than
debt, the Third Circuit's interpretation of the law is warranted.
DouglasJ. Olcott

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-ARBITRARY DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR COUNSEL OF CHOICE PRO

HAC VICE IS PER SE REVERSIBLE-Fuller v. Diesslin,

868 F.2d

604 (3d Cir. 1989).
On November 14th, 1980, a New Jersey state trooper
stopped and detained for speeding a motor vehicle in which Glen
Fuller was a passenger. 868 F.2d at 605, 612. During a consensual search of that vehicle, the state trooper found large quantities of cocaine and marijuana. As a result, Fuller and Douglas
Chapee, the driver of the vehicle, were arrested and subsequently
indicted in New Jersey Superior Court on charges of possession
of a controlled dangerous substance, as well as the unlawful possession of a weapon. Id. at 605. Fuller filed a pretrial motion
seeking representation pro hac vice by lawyers from Illinois and
the District of Columbia. In denying Fuller's motion, the trial
judge reasoned that Fuller's local counsel was competent and
moreover, the probable delay and inconvenience that would result from utilizing out-of-state counsel clearly overcame a criminal defendant's right to choose his own counsel. Id. at 605-06.
Fuller was subsequently denied leave to appeal that motion to
the New Jersey appellate division as well as the supreme court.
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Id. at 606. Fuller then filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, demanding injunctive relief
against the state court proceedings. Because the state criminal
proceeding was pending, the district court abstained. Id. (citing
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).

Pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor, Fuller and
Chappee entered guilty pleas to the charges of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The prosecutor dismissed all remaining counts. Fuller preserved his counsel of choice issue for
appeal and was sentenced to twenty years in prison and a
$20,000 fine.
Fuller subsequently appealed to the appellate division which
affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied Fuller's motion for admission of
counsel pro hac vice. The court also noted that Fuller had received "extremely competent representation." Id. (citing State v.
Chappee, 211 N.J. Super. 321, 335, 511 A.2d 1197, 1205 (App.
Div. 1986)).
Fuller then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, contending
that he was arbitrarily denied his right to counsel of choice. Id. at
606. Granting the writ, United States District Judge Harold A.
Ackerman ruled that the existence of competent local counsel
does not trump the defendant's right to counsel of choice. Noting that modern transportation had made the legal profession extremely mobile, Judge Ackerman objected to the trial court's
generalization regarding possible delays which would occur from
the use of out-of-state counsel. The district court thus concluded
that the deprivation of a criminal defendant's right to counsel of
choice does not require a showing of prejudice and is per se reversible. Id. (citing United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 960 (3d

Cir. 1986); United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 58 (3d Cir. 1979)).
Writing for the majority, Judge Becker conducted a threepart analysis to determine whether Fuller's sixth amendment
right to counsel had been violated. Id. at 606-11. The majority
first addressed whether the sixth amendment right to counsel of
choice included a right to counsel pro hac vice. Id. at 606-07. In
noting that the issue was one of first impression, Judge Becker
determined that the right to counsel pro hac vice should not be
treated differently than other requests for counsel of choice. Id.
at 607. Recognizing that litigants' requests for out-of-state counsel is occurring more frequently, the Third Circuit ruled that the
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right to counsel pro hac vice is encompassed analytically within
the sixth amendment right to counsel of choice legal framework.
Id.
Although a defendant's right to counsel of choice should not
be arbitrarily denied, the court noted that this right may be limited by a trial court in ensuring that fair and proper administration of justice is maintained. Id. (citations omitted). The
majority determined that its recent decision in United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1988) controlled the instant case.
Fuller, 868 F.2d at 607-08. In Romano, a federal district court revoked a defendant's pro se status and appointed counsel. Id. at
608 (citing United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir.
1988)). The defendant sought counsel of her choice and the district court denied her request. Id. at 608 (citing United States v.
Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir. 1988)). The Third Circuit
held that this denial violated the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel of choice and that the arbitrary denial mandated
per se reversal of the trial judge's ruling. Id. (citing United States
v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 820 (3d Cir. 1988)).
The court next rejected New Jersey's argument that the denial of counsel of choice is not per se reversible and a harmless
error or prejudice standard should apply. Id. at 608-09. New
Jersey argued that the right to counsel of choice is encompassed
analytically within the right to effective assistance of counsel. Id.
at 608. And because a recent United States Supreme Court decision ruled that the essential aim of the sixth amendment is to
guarantee effective assistance of counsel, New Jersey argued that
a per se reversible standard would not fit within such a reading of
the amendment. Id. at 608 (citing Wheat v. United States, 108 S.
Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988)).
The court next attempted to determine whether the right to
counsel of choice was more akin to the right to self-representation or the right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. While conceding that the effective assistance of counsel mandates a
prejudice standard, the court noted that the denial of the right to
self-representation is per se reversible. Id. Although the
Supreme Court in Wheat stated in dicta that the right to counsel
of choice is not analogous to the right to self-representation,
thereby implying that a per se analysis would not apply, the majority instead chose to rely on more concrete Third Circuit precedent that required a per se reversal. Id. at 608-09 (citing United
States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v.
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Rankin, 779 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1986)). The court stated that only
a more definite mandate from the Supreme Court or an en banc
opinion from the Third Circuit would necessitate a contrary ruling. Id. at 609. Accordingly, the court concluded that a per se
reversal standard must be applied when a court arbitrarily denies
a criminal defendant his right to counsel of choice. Id.
The third portion of the court's opinion addressed whether
the state trial court's denial of counsel pro hac vice was arbitrary.
The majority initially affirmed the district court ruling that local
counsel are not, per se, more knowledgeable than out-of-state
counsel and further stated that the use of out-of-state counsel
would not necessarily delay criminal proceedings. Id. The court
next addressed New Jersey's argument that because Fuller's local
counsel was competent, his sixth amendment rights were not violated. Id. at 610. NewJersey extrapolated this argument from a
recent Supreme Court decision wherein the Court stated that the
right to effective counsel is the essential aim of the sixth amendment. Id. (citing Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697
(1988)). The majority dismissed New Jersey's contentions by ruling that other rights are encompassed within sixth amendment
jurisprudence, including the right to select one's preferred attorney. Id. (citing Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697
(1988)).
The court proceeded to quote at length from a prior Third
Circuit decision which spoke to the importance of a criminal defendant's right to choose his or her own counsel. Id. (quoting
United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979)). The court
characterized this right as critical and reiterated that the only
concerns necessary in such situations are the defendant's right to
counsel of choice as well as ensuring that the fair and proper administration of justice is maintained. Id. Accordingly, the court
concluded that a trial court must not make generalizations that
the use of out-of-state counsel will cause delay in a criminal trial.
Id. at 611. Rather, the court admonished that the trial courts
must examine all relevant factors in using their discretion to determine whether out-of-state counsel would frustrate the administration ofjustice. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Weis argued that the trial
court properly used its discretion in denying Fuller's motion for
counsel pro hac vice. Id. at 612 (Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent also criticized the majority for prematurely addressing constitutional issues in the case. Id. The dissent argued that the
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right to counsel of choice is not absolute, but rather requires the
court to balance whether that right will interfere with the fair and
proper administration ofjustice. Id. at 613 (Weis,J., dissenting).
After carefully examining the record, Judge Weis asserted that
the trial judge had evaluated all the circumstances including
flight cancellations, lost baggage, etc., which may contribute to
delay of a proceeding when an out-of-state attorney represents a
criminal defendant. Id. at 614 (Weis,J., dissenting). The dissent
thus concluded that the trial judge had not abused his discretion
in denying Fuller the representation of out-of-state counsel. Id.
The sixth amendment right to counsel includes the right to
counsel of choice. As a result, criminal defendants have the right
to choose the attorney they believe will best represent their
cause, including the right to be represented by out-of-state counsel. This right may only be limited by extraordinary countervailing interests which would severely disrupt a criminal
proceeding. Thus, when a trial court denies a criminal defendant's request for counsel of choice, the court must, on a case-bycase basis specifically set forth on the record the reasons for denying such a request. An arbitrary denial is not permitted, and
requires per se reversal. The court in Fuller correctly recognized
that the trial court had not specifically examined the facts of the
instant case to determine whether the use of out-of-state counsel
would interfere with the proper administration of justice. Blanket generalizations regarding delay in travel, etc., will not suffice.
Thus, the court correctly applied a per se reversal standard.
Thomas P. Scrivo

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-TESTIMONY
OF GOVERNMENT AGENTS IS BARRED WHEN THEIR PRESENCE
IS UNNECESSARY DURING INVENTORY SEARCH OF PREMISES INTO CIVIL FORFEITURE ACTION-United States v.
Showalter, 858 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1988).
CIDENT

On June 22nd, 1987, the Pennsylvania State Police, acting
pursuant to a search warrant seized laboratory equipment, chemicals, methamphetamine, formulae and several firearms from the
Myerstown, Pennsylvania premises leased by John Showalter and
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his wife. 858 F.2d at 150. Soon thereafter, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) commenced -further investigation, and the
United States instituted an in rem forfeiture action to seize the
Showalter property. The United States obtained an order from
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania permitting the United States Marshal's Service to conduct an inventory
search of the premises subject to forfeiture. Deputy Marshal
Gerald Reilly contacted DEA agent Bryan Donga for a "briefing"
prior to execution of the order. Id. at 151. Agent Donga then
arranged for the presence of three DEA agents and two Pennsylvania state police officers who eventually accompanied Deputy
Marshal Reilly and his administrative assistant on the videotaped
inventory of the Showalters' home.
The marshals asked that the Showalters accompany them
during the videotaping of their, house and neighboring barn, but
at one point Mr. Showalter left them, purportedly to telephone
his attorney. However, the DEA agents and state troopers saw
him in his yard and interrupted the inventory to return him to the
area of the videotaping. Upon his return, Deputy Marshal Reilly
noticed briers on Showalter's garments, and an unrecognizable
but unusual odor emanating from him. The State Police and
DEA agents later identified the smell as methamphetamine, and
they consequently procured a search warrant for the premises,
based upon the troopers' affidavits. The resultant search yielded
additional laboratory equipment, phenyl-2-propanone and other
chemicals.
Showalter was arrested and indicted for possession and manufacture of non-narcotic controlled substances under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (1988). Showalter, 858 F.2d at 151. The defendant
pleaded not guilty and his attorneys moved to suppress the evidence. Id. The district court suppressed all evidence from the
recent search, including the testimony of the agents and troopers
regarding the smell of methamphetamine on Showalter's clothing. Id. The court's bar of the officials' testimony was the sole
portion of the ruling which the United States contested on appeal
to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Id.
The court of appeals first acknowledged the Showalters' reasonable expectation of privacy in their premises, which was reasonable even after the arrest of the forfeitable property. Id.
(citing United States v. Ladson,, 774 F.2d 436 (11 th Cir. 1985)).
District judge Clarkson Fisher then articulated the central focus
of this case: the lawfulness of the presence of the state troopers
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and DEA agents during the marshals' authorized inventory
search. See id. at 152. Beginning its analysis, the bench noted
and deferred to the trial court's finding that the presence of the
troopers and agents was neither judicially authorized nor reasonably necessary to the marshals' governmental purpose of executing the inventory order. Id. This finding served to reject the
government's argument that such an inventory order imputes authority upon its executors "to do that which is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of [safe entry]," including
appointment of supporting personnel without express judicial
authorization. Id.
The appellate court also echoed the lower court's discord
regarding the prosecution's second, "inventory exception" argument, i.e., court authorization is unnecessary in situations of routine performance of a reasonable intrusion upon residential
property incident to an inventory. Id. The court stressed that
absent exigent circumstances, the inventory exception to the warrant requirement applies only to the special category of automobile inventory searches. Id. at 153. The basis for the court's
careful distinction between home and vehicle inventories was
"the most stringent Fourth-Amendment protection" traditionally
afforded to private dwellings. Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)). Despite the demonstrated
inapplicability of the inventory exception to the instant scenario,
Judge Fisher nevertheless posited that the factors justifying the
exception for automobiles were not present in the case at bar. Id.
Finally, the court was particularly concerned with the absence of evidence that the supporting personnel were enlisted
pursuant to a uniform police procedure for the conduct of inventories. See id. at 153-54. In view of the lack of functional need for
the supporting personnel, and the prosecution's inability to link
the instant inventory scenario to a well-established, standardized
police procedure, the Showalter court affirmed the trial court's
suppression of the "olfactory testimony." Id. at 154. The presiding judge was careful to note that the proper rationale was not
that the search was overly intrusive to the Showalters' fourth
amendment rights, but that the government had failed to advance a legitimate purpose for the intrusion by additional persons. Id. at 153 n.4.
The main thrust of the Showalter holding is to place reigns
upon the potentially unfettered discretion of government officials
in their methods of executing intrusive residential searches.
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However, the threshold of necessity in such cases remains amorphous, thus compelling continued case-by-case balancing of interests. Nevertheless, the Showalter decision is at least a caveat to
the enforcer, reminding the official that, though occasionally
fraught with iniquity, the home is yet the castle of its inhabitants.
Thomas R. Walters

